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AD NEELEMAN
1. Marr’s Three Levels of Description
My comments on Pullum’s article will follow after a considerable detour. But for
those who want to know where I am headed, let me summarize my criticism in
a sentence. In my view, several of the arguments that Pullum presents in favour
of a constraint-based model of grammar are weakened considerably by the fact
that not enough consideration is given to the distinction between competence and
performance.
I begin with the basics. Marr (1982) argues that any machine carrying out an
information-processing task must be understood at three levels of description. Marr
calls these levels computational, algorithmic, and implementational. The computational
level of description is the most abstract. It gives an account of the device in terms of
the logical structure of the mapping that it carries out from one type of information
to another. If we are talking about a cash register (which is Marr’s example), one of
the things it does is addition:
(1) +
The next level down is a description of the algorithm that yields the desired
input–output mapping. I do not know what algorithms a cash register uses,
but in (2) I give four examples of algorithms that people use for addition. I
will not discuss details, as the pictures are largely self-explanatory. The point
is simply that there can be numerous algorithmic instantiations of a function
like (1).1
Address for correspondence: Department of Linguistics, Room 110, Chandler House, 2
Wakefield Street, London WC1N 1PF, UK.
Email: a.neeleman@ucl.ac.uk
1 The importance of a workable algorithm becomes apparent when one uses roman numerals to
add 431 (CDXXXI) to 1723 (MDCCXXIII).
Mind & Language, Vol. 28, No. 4 September 2013, pp. 522–531.
© 2013 The Authors. Mind & Language published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Comments on Pullum 523
(d) Lattice Algorithm(2)
(Found at http://faculty.atu.edu/mfinan/2033/section12.pdf)
At the most basic level, we must offer a description of how the algorithm and its
input and output are realized physically. It will be clear that there are potentially
many physical implementations of any given algorithm. Below are a few pictures
of cash machines to illustrate this; it is conceivable that the machines depicted all
carry out a very similar algorithm using very different hardware.
(3)
The crucial fact to be recognized is that the relation between Marr’s three levels of
description need not be transparent (the same function can map to many algorithms,
which in turn can map to many physical implementations). This means that a full
understanding of a computational device requires a description at all three levels.
2. How Does Linguistics Fit In?
The human language faculty is of course a computuational device. The study
of language should therefore contribute descriptions at the computational,
algorithmic and implementational level. These map naturally onto three subdis-
ciplines: theoretical linguistics, psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics. Theoretical
linguistics deals with knowledge of language; that is, it gives a description
of the formal properties of the way in which language associates sound and
meaning. Psycholinguistics deals with the algorithms that implement knowledge of
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language in speech production and speech perception (among many other things).
Neurolinguistics deals with the hardware implementation of these algorithms
in the brain. The following diagram from Neeleman and Van de Koot, 2010
might be helpful in clarifying the overall picture (see that paper for details):
conceptual-
intentional
system
articulatory
system
auditory
system
generator
(encoder)
parser
(decoder)
Theoretical
grammar (code)
(4)
Neuro ? ?? ? ? ?
Psycho
? ? ?
This characterization of the task that linguistics faces is of course not new. As the
quote in (5) demonstrates, it is how Marr interprets the enterprise. In this quote Marr
presupposes some form of generative grammar (referred to as ‘Chomsky’s theory’),
but of course the conclusion reached is independent of the exact computational
description of the language faculty one adopts (that is, it is true, whether the syntax
is constraint-based or modelled as a generative procedure).
(5) [F]inding algorithms by which Chomsky’s theory may be implemented is a
completely different endeavor from formulating the theory itself. In our terms,
it is a study at a different level, and both tasks have to be done (Marr, 1982,
p. 28).
In fact, Chomsky argued already in 1965 that theoretical linguistics is distinct from
the study of linguistic algorithms and their neural implementation. The terms he
used to characterize the distinction are competence (as described by linguistic theory)
and performance (as described, much later, by psycho- and neuro-linguistics). This
point is hammered home very early on in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax:
(6) Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance
(Chomsky, 1965, p. 3).
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(7) When we say that a sentence has a certain derivation with respect to a particular
generative grammar, we say nothing about how the speaker or hearer might
proceed, in some practical or efficient way, to construct such a derivation. These
questions belong to the theory of language use—the theory of performance
(Chomsky, 1965, p. 9).
Although some of the clarity of Aspects has been lost along the way, I still believe that
the only coherent interpretation of recent syntactic theorizing (including theorizing
in the Minimalist Program) crucially relies on the competence-performance distinc-
tion (and hence on Marr’s view of what it means to study a computational device).
3. Constraints and Procedures
The central conclusion of Pullum’s article is that it is better to conceive of syntactic
theory as a set of constraints (MTS) than as a generative procedure (GES). At first
sight, this seems to neatly match the model in (4). After all, constraints are static
and are therefore most naturally conceived of as belonging to the most abstract
level of description. Given that parsing and generation of linguistic utterances must
be procedural, one might be inclined to think of procedures as belonging to the
intermediate level of description.
Indeed, a parser that makes use of constraints to filter out ill-formed structures
generated by a minimally specified structure builder is unlikely to be successful.
The structure builder will be able to generate a very large number of structures, the
vast majority of which will have to be rejected. The effort required to deal with
these ill-formed structures will quickly overwhelm the parsing process (for relevant
discussion, see Marcus, 1980; Berwick and Weinberg, 1984; Abney, 1991; and Kolb
and Thiersch, 1991). Here’s a toy example from Neeleman and Van de Koot, 2010
which illustrates the growth of candidate structures for a given input depending on
how many grammatical constraints are incorporated in the structure builder:
(8) A B C D E
Men (1 word) 1 1 1 2 1
Men slept (2 words) 2 2 1 4 1
The man slept (3 words) 12 8 2 8 1
Men bought a book (4 words) 112 40 5 16 1
A man bought a book (5 words) 1360 224 14 32 1
Men said men bought a book (6 words) 19872 1344 42 64 1
Men said a man bought a book (7 words) ? 8448 132 128 1
A: merge with weak inclusiveness and binary branching built in
B: merge with strong inclusiveness and binary branching built in
C: merge with strong inclusiveness, binary branching and label assignment
under directionality built in
D: 2n
E: merge with strong inclusiveness, binary branching, label assignment
under directionality and selection built in
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It is not important to know the nature of the grammatical constraints referred to
(‘weak inclusiveness’, ‘binary branching’, etc.). These are discussed in some detail in
Neeleman and Van de Koot, 2010, for those who have an interest in such matters.
What is important is that the parsing process looks likely to succeed only if almost
all relevant grammatical constraints are incorporated in the structure builder (as in
column E). Therefore, if constraints have a place anywhere in linguistics, they must
be part of linguistic theory / the theory of competence / the computational level
of description.
However, neither the fact that a constraint-based account of the language faculty
must belong to the computational level of description, nor the fact that an account
at the algorithmic level of description must be procedural, implies that an account
at the computational level must be non-procedural. It is possible that the most
insightful description of the formal properties of the way in which language
associates sound and meaning is in terms of a generative procedure. All that the
model in (4) tells us is that such a procedure would not have to map transparently
onto the procedures that are relevant to parsing and generation. We should let the
facts decide between these different views. But what facts?
4. Native Speaker Judgments
The main data used to test linguistic theories consist of native speaker intuitions
concerning the grammaticality of test sentences. For example, if I want to find out
whether English is an SOV or SVO language, I may ask a native speaker to judge
the following:
(9) .a. John the book bought.
b. John bought the book.
It is tempting to treat grammaticality judgments as directly providing evidence
about the grammar of a language. However, this would be a fallacy. Grammaticality
judgments do not directly probe knowledge of language. A speaker judging the
acceptability of a sentence must use the hardware at their disposal to parse incoming
speech sounds. As the parsing algorithms implement the grammar, the experience of
ungrammaticality could be seen as one in which the parser is unable to assign a single
connected structure to a given string. In other words, grammaticality judgments
are a performance phenomenon used by theoretical linguists to make decisions
about matters of competence. We must therefore be careful in our interpretation
of the ‘data’. What we think of as data are not simply facts about grammatical
competence.
It stands to reason that the parser will have evolved to be as fast and as robust as
possible. Both properties can give rise to misleading results, in that they may lead
to twists in the relationship between grammaticality at the computational level and
acceptability as experienced by subjects asked for their intuitions.
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For example, it is well known that certain grammatical errors in subject-verb
agreement tend to escape the attention of subjects when a different NP with
appropriate features appears in the vicinity of the verb (as in the ungrammatical
example in (10); see Wagers, Lau and Phillips, 2009). This is presumably the result
of a performance system that favours speed over accuracy.
(10) ∗The key to the cabinets unsurprisingly were rusty from years of disuse.
Robustness in parsing means that a hearer may be able to assign an interpretation
to an input for which no complete structure exists according to the rules of
grammar. This could be the result of discourse-level processes, but for certain ill-
formed sentences it is feasible that the performance mechanisms carry out repairs.
A low-level example of such a repair is phoneme restoration2 (Warren, 1970). It
seems likely to me that there are higher-level repairs that locally affect phoneme,
morpheme or constituent order, among other things. In other words, while some
strings that are ungrammatical (in that they cannot be covered by a single connected
structure) will be beyond salvation, other ungrammatical strings can probably be
assigned a single connected structure, albeit at the cost of extra parsing efforts
required for repairs. This is true, whether knowledge of language is described in
terms of constraints or procedures.
In all likelihood, the reverse situation also exists. Some perfectly grammatical
structures are hard to parse (for instance because they give rise to garden path
effects), or in fact impossible to parse. It has been argued that certain cases of
multiple centre embedding may fall in the latter category (that is, the parser is held
responsible for the unacceptability of examples like the cheese that the mouse that the
cat caught ate was imported from France).
Thus, hypotheses about the grammar do not directly predict grammaticality
judgments. They predict grammaticality judgments in conjunction with a theory
of performance about which relatively little is known. For reasons of practicality,
linguists must therefore work under some idealization of the influence of the
performance systems on grammaticality judgments.
The standard assumption is that this influence is negligible (compare the quote in
(6)). However, some linguistics have made other assumptions that are usually not
explicitly presented as such and that assume some degree of transparency between
the descriptions of the language faculty at the computational and descriptive levels.
The idea is that, at least in some cases, there is systematic association between the
level of experienced unacceptability and the grammatical principle that is violated.
2 In Warren’s own words:
In 1970, I reported that when a speech sound or an entire syllable in a sentence was deleted and
replaced by a louder noise such as a cough, the sentence seemed intact, and even when listeners
were informed that a portion of the sentence was deleted and replaced by a cough, they could not
identify the missing speech sounds nor could they locate the extraneous sound’s position in the
sentence (http://recherche.ircam.fr/equipes/pcm/cheveign/sh/keele/warren/warren.html).
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For example, in movement theory, violations of Subjacency are taken to give rise
to weak unacceptability, as compared to violations of the Empty Category Principle
(see Chomsky, 1986, among others). If correct, this could be explained in a model
like (4) by saying that there is a repair strategy for (certain) Subjacency violations,
but not for ECP violations, leading to subjects having different experiences of
two types of examples that are both ungrammatical at the computational level of
description.
While this is a perfectly reasonable way to proceed, the reality is that we cannot
know before hand where the data reflect properties of the grammar (as instantiated
in the performance systems) and where they reflect aspects of the performance
systems that have to do with efficiency and robustness. In other words, in testing
hypotheses about the grammar additional hypotheses about the implementation
of the grammar in the performance systems must be made, and what is tested
is this constellation of hypotheses, rather than grammatical theory on its own.
There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, except perhaps that it is rarely
commented on in the literature.
5. Pullum’s Arguments Against GES and in Favour of MTS
It seems to me that the issue explored in the previous sections is particularly relevant
to the arguments that Pullum presents in favour of a constraint-based grammar
(or a model-theoretic syntax, to be more precise). These arguments are built on
general properties of linguistic data that—in the absence of a thorough analysis of
individual examples—may not reflect the grammar itself, but could just as well
be contributed to limitations of the performance systems as a tool for generating
grammaticality judgments.
I first consider the argument from gradience of ungrammaticality. The idea is that
the standard derivational model of grammar cannot deal with the fact that some
sentences are neither fully acceptable, nor fully unacceptable. This is because a
generative procedure, by its very nature, can either produce a string or not produce
a string. There is no middle way. A constraint-based grammar, however, allows
strings that violate certain constrains, but not others.
If the observable data were direct expressions of competence grammar, this
would be a very strong argument. But as argued above, the data are not. A
subject’s experience of a test sentence does of course depend on whether that
sentence is grammatical (that is, whether in parsing it can be covered by a single
connected structure). However, to repeat, it also depends on how easy it is to
find a covering structure (if one exists) and how easy errors are detected (if
the sentence is ungrammatical). If no covering structure is found, the subject’s
experience will further be affected by whether or not the substructures the parser
builds up can be integrated though discourse mechanisms and whether or not there
are repair mechanisms that can fix the problem. Given this range of factors, we
expect, irrespective of the nature of the competence grammar, to find variation
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in grammaticality judgments. In particular, gradience of judgments is perfectly
compatible with a description of knowledge of language in terms of a generative
procedure. As the example of Subjacency violations versus ECP violations in the
previous section demonstrated, this is true, even if the variation in judgments is
taken to reflect violations of specific grammatical principles.
The same general issue affects Pullum’s other arguments. Take the fact that
people are able to give grammaticality judgments of sentence fragments. Admittedly, this
fact cannot be accounted for by a competence grammar that employs a generative
procedure that must start with, or terminate in, an S-symbol. But that is not a
problem, as the relevant fact will have to be accounted for in any case by any
description of the language faculty at the algorithmic level. It is well known that
parsing is incremental (see Gorrell, 1995 and references mentioned there). People
are able to recover an interpretation for incoming language word by word. This
implies that the performance mechanisms, while designed to operate in accordance
with the rules of grammar, must be able to deal with incomplete structures. But
if an account is available (or must be developed) for the interpretability (and
acceptability) of incomplete structures at the algorithmic level, we are not required
to provide an additional account at the computational level (that is, as a part of our
competence grammar).
Similarly, there is no problem for a conception of the syntax as a generative
procedure arising from the lexical independence of grammaticality judgments. Lexical
dependence is incorrectly predicted to exist by models of the language faculty in
which the grammar is seen as a generative procedure and is held directly responsible
for parsing. But there is no need to make this combination of assumptions. The
problem dissolves if parser and grammar are taken to be descriptions of the language
faculty at different levels. The robustness of the parser makes it likely that the
parsing process will not terminate if a terminal is identified whose phonology does
not match an existing word. In fact, this must be so in view of the phoneme
restoration effect. In case the input contains a phonological form that is not part of
a speaker’s permanent lexicon, a good strategy might be to store the relevant form
in a ‘temporary lexicon’, and to try and identify a meaning for it (presumably, this
is how new words are learned). Again, this can and should be dealt with at the
algorithmic level; there is no need to burden the competence grammar with it.
Finally, Pullum points to the existence of syntactic quandaries—cases like (11),
where there does not seem to be an expression of the form specified that is fully
grammatical and has the intended meaning.3
(11) ?Nobody reviewed he/him/his and I’s/me’s/mine book.
The idea behind the argument is that a generative procedure either produces a
well-formed output or ‘crashes’ and therefore produces no output at all. In (11)
3 Pullum also discusses acquisition, but it seems to me that this issue is neutral between the two
views of competence grammar under consideration.
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there is no grammatical way to express the intended content and yet alternatives do
not seem fully ungrammatical either. Quandaries of this type, Pullum suggests, are
therefore incompatible with a conception of the grammar as employing a generative
procedure.
But it seems to me that this argument is really not very different from the
argument from gradience of ungrammaticality, and my reaction is therefore not
very different either. As long as the grammar is taken to be a characterization of
the language faculty at the computational level, it is possible that there are cases in
which a given semantic content cannot be expressed by a structure of a particular
form. But in view of the robust nature of parsing, it is entirely possible that in
performance some of the ungrammatical candidate structures can be associated with
the intended interpretation through repair mechanisms of various types, giving
rise to an experience in subjects that is neither one of grammaticality nor one of
ungrammaticality.
6. Conclusion
None of this means that competence grammar is not constraint-based. It just shows
that we need better arguments to decide the issue. One kind of argument that I
personally find intriguing is frequently used in Optimality Theory. In this constraint-
based theory, the evaluation procedure for candidate structures is defined in such a
way that a set of constraints used to describe a given language automatically generates
a language typology, thus increasing testability. Such typological predictions of
course do not follow from any known generative procedure.
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